Corrections regarding false statements of fact by Bloomberg L.P., The Edge Singapore, The Independent Singapore, and The Online Citizen

1. The Ministry of Law is aware of the following publications that communicate false statements of fact about Good Class Bungalow (“GCB”) transactions:

   1. Bloomberg L.P. (“Bloomberg”) article published on its website on 12 December 2024 (“Bloomberg article”) and reposted on Bloomberg’s accounts on Facebook and X.

   2. The Bloomberg article was republished in full by The Edge Singapore on 12 December 2024 and reposted on The Edge Singapore’s account on Facebook;

   3. The Independent Singapore (“TISG”) article published on its website on 12 December 2024 and reposted on TISG’s account on Facebook; and

   4. The Online Citizen (“TOC”) article published on its website on 12 December 2024 and reposted on TOC’s accounts on Facebook and Instagram.

2. The Bloomberg article communicates the following falsehoods:

   1. There are no publicly available government records of GCB sale transactions if caveats are not lodged.

   2. The identity of the ultimate beneficial owner need not be disclosed to the government, and the government is therefore not aware of the ultimate beneficial owner’s identity, in GCB property transactions bought using a trust arrangement or shell company.

   3. GCB property transactions can be carried out without any checks by the government on the identities of the ultimate beneficial owners.

   4. The primary responsibility to combat money laundering in property transactions is left to property agents and other service providers.

   5. For GCB property transactions there is:

      1. no publicly available government record of the GCB transaction if no caveat is lodged; and

      2. no requirement to disclose to the government the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner in a trust arrangement or shell company;
         and this allows parties (including Ministers and rich migrants) to transact such properties in a way facilitative of money laundering.

3. The falsehoods contained in the other publications are set out in the attached Annex.

4. These false statements attack the transparency of property transactions in Singapore. Together, these falsehoods give the impression that Singapore does not have a robust legal framework to require disclosure of information to the government in GCB transactions, which may allow wrongdoing to take place undetected. It is in the public interest that these falsehoods are addressed so that public confidence in the government is not undermined.

Facts:

Information on property ownership and transfers, including for all GCBs, is available on the Integrated Land Information Service portal (“INLIS”), regardless of whether a caveat was lodged for the sale transaction.

5. Information on property ownership and transfers, including for all GCBs, is available on INLIS which is managed by the Singapore Land Authority (“SLA”). This is regardless of whether a caveat was lodged for the sale transaction.

6. Caveats are not intended for tracking property transactions or ensuring transparency. The purpose of a caveat is to protect the interest of the purchaser, mortgagee or other parties that hold a legal right in the property. They are lodged voluntarily by parties who wish to protect their interest in a property. For example, one who purchases property may choose to lodge a caveat to protect his/her interest pending completion of the transaction and lodgement of the final transfer with SLA’s Land Titles Registry.

The government mandates strict disclosure of identities and citizenship of purchasers and ultimate beneficial owners in all landed residential property transactions, including GCB transactions.

7. The government has clear disclosure requirements on the identities and citizenship of purchasers and ultimate beneficial owners for all landed residential property transactions, including GCB transactions. This is regardless of whether a caveat is lodged for the transaction, and regardless of whether the purchase is made by an individual, an entity, or through a vehicle such as a trust or company, including a shell company.

8. The government adopts a strict approach to the ownership of landed residential properties by foreigners. Under the Residential Property Act 1976 (“RPA”), foreign individuals (including Permanent Residents) and foreign entities seeking to acquire such properties must obtain approval. There have been no approvals given to any foreign purchasers to acquire any GCBs since 2021, in any capacity, whether personal or otherwise.

9. As part of the sale process for landed residential properties, including GCBs, SLA requires the purchaser’s identity and citizenship to be declared to SLA when lodging the instrument of transfer at the Land Titles Registry. Furthermore, the purchaser’s solicitor must certify that the information provided in the instrument of transfer is correct and that all relevant provisions of the RPA have been complied with.

10. In addition:

    1. For all landed residential property transactions made through trust arrangements, solicitors are required to produce a copy of the trust deed to SLA. SLA checks and verifies the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner.

    2. For all landed residential property transactions where the purchaser or beneficial owner is a company, the applicant has to meet strict requirements before it can obtain a Clearance Certificate to purchase the landed residential property. The company must be incorporated in Singapore and all their directors and members must be Singapore Citizens or Singapore entities as defined under the RPA. In addition, Singapore-incorporated companies are required by the Companies Act 1967 to maintain accurate and up-to-date information on their beneficial ownership.

The government has the primary responsibility to combat money laundering in property transactions, and has put in place a robust anti-money laundering (“AML”) framework to counter money-laundering risks in property transactions.

11. The government has put in place a robust AML framework to counter money-laundering risks, which is applicable in the context of property transactions, including transactions made through trust arrangements and companies. The framework is underpinned by a three-pronged strategy:

    1. Strengthening our legal and regulatory framework to Prevent criminals from operating in Singapore;

    2. Developing measures to better Detect signs of illicit activity; and

    3. Taking decisive administrative, regulatory and criminal measures to Enforce our laws.

12. The government requires regulated ‘gatekeepers’ in the private sector involved in property transactions to comply with AML requirements to conduct checks to identify and verify the identities of their customers, including the beneficial owners. Where there are higher risks, gatekeepers must also verify the sources of wealth of their customers. The financial institutions involved are required to know the customers and purpose of the transactions, and as needed, the sources of the funds. The requirements are strict and similar to standards in leading financial centres. Obligations are also imposed on lawyers handling the transactions, real estate salespersons, and estate agencies. These requirements and obligations are under law.

13. The government also requires these gatekeepers, including the financial institutions, to have processes in place to identify and file a Suspicious Transaction Report promptly with the Suspicious Transaction Reporting Office in the Commercial Affairs Department of the Singapore Police Force upon detecting any suspicious activities that may be linked to criminal conduct in their interactions with their customers. The government is responsible to analyse the information reported and take enforcement action.

14. The Minister for Culture, Community and Youth and Second Minister for Law, Mr Edwin Tong, has instructed the Protection from Online Falsehoods and Manipulation Act (POFMA) Office to issue a Correction Direction to Bloomberg L.P., The Edge Singapore, The Independent Singapore and The Online Citizen in respect of their articles or posts. The Correction Direction requires the recipients to insert a notice against the original article or post (or in a specified online location, where the article or post has been removed), with a link to the Government’s clarification.

Annex: Falsehoods communicated in each publication

1. The article by The Edge Singapore communicates the following falsehoods:

   1. There are no publicly available government records of Good Class Bungalow (“GCB”) sale transactions if caveats are not lodged.

   2. The identity of the ultimate beneficial owner need not be disclosed to the government, and the government is therefore not aware of the ultimate beneficial owner’s identity, in GCB property transactions bought using a trust arrangement or shell company.

   3. GCB property transactions can be carried out without any checks by the government on the identities of the ultimate beneficial owners.

   4. The primary responsibility to combat money laundering in property transactions is left to property agents and other service providers.

   5. For GCB property transactions there is:

      1. no publicly available government record of the GCB transaction if no caveat is lodged; and

      2. no requirement to disclose to the government the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner in a trust arrangement or shell company;
         and this allows parties (including Ministers and rich migrants) to transact such properties in a way facilitative of money laundering.

2. The article by The Independent Singapore communicates the following falsehoods:

   1. There are no publicly available government records of GCB sale transactions if caveats are not lodged.

   2. There is no requirement to disclose the identity of the ultimate beneficial owners, to the government, where GCBs are purchased through shell companies or trust arrangements.

   3. For GCB property transactions there is:

      1. no publicly available government record of the GCB transaction if no caveat is lodged; and

      2. no requirement to disclose to the government the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner in a trust arrangement or shell company;
         and this allows parties to transact such properties away from public scrutiny or government oversight.

3. The article by The Online Citizen communicates the following falsehoods:

   1. There are no publicly available government records of GCB sale transactions if caveats are not lodged.

   2. The identity of the ultimate beneficial owner need not be disclosed to the government, and the government is therefore not aware of the ultimate beneficial owner’s identity, in GCB property transactions bought using a trust arrangement.

   3. GCB property transactions can be carried out without any checks by the government on the identities of the ultimate beneficial owners.

   4. For GCB property transactions there is:

      1. no publicly available government record of the GCB transaction if no caveat is lodged; and

      2. no requirement to disclose to the government the identity of the ultimate beneficial owner in a trust arrangement;
         and this allows parties (including Ministers) to transact such properties away from public scrutiny or government oversight.